It is because of the virtual character of the big Other that, as Lacan put it at the very end of his “Seminar on the Purloined Letter,” a letter always arrives at its destination. One can even say that the only letter that fully and effectively arrives at its destination is the unsent letter – its true addressee is not flesh-and-blood others, but the big Other itself:
“The preservation of the unsent letter is its arresting feature. Neither the writing not the sending is remarkable (we often make drafts of letters and discard them), but the gesture of keeping the message when we have no intention of sending it. By saving the letter, we are in some sense 'sending' it after all. We are not relinquishing our idea or dismissing it as foolish or unworthy (as we do when we tear up a letter); on the contrary, we are giving it an extra vote of confidence. We are, in effect, saying that our idea is too precious to be entrusted to the actual addressee, who may not grasp its worth, so we 'send' it to his equivalent in fantasy, on whom we can absolutely count for an understanding and appreciative reading.”
Addendum: Again, Lacan in his own words:
"And why the Other with a capital O? For a no doubt mad reason, in the same way as it is madness every time we are obliged to bring in signs supplementary to those given by language. Here the mad reason is the following. You are my wife – after all, what do you know about it? You are my master – in reality, are you so sure of that? What creates the founding value of those words is that what is aimed at in the message, as well as what is manifest in the pretence, is that the other is there qua absolute Other. Absolute, that is to say he is recognized, but is not known. In the same way, what constitutes pretence is that, in the end, you don’t know whether it’s a pretence or not. Essentially it is this unknown element in the alterity of the other which characterizes the speech relation on the level on which it is spoken to the other."
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Just food for thought:
Chomsky on Lacan: "amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan" (he also admits that his early works are worth analyzing). In another post I can longer find the link to, Chomsky concedes he does not actually understand many of Lacan's writings.
http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html
For a rather harsh criticism of the book you are outlining:
http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol5-2001/n17oneill
"In the absence of any detectable method, a dizzying array of wildly entertaining and often quite maddening rhetorical strategies are deployed in order to beguile, browbeat, dumbfound, dazzle, confuse, mislead, overwhelm, and generally subdue the reader into acceptance. Example after example is supplied, but the principle that makes them examples is not itself given. Appeals are implicitly made to Lacan's authority but the source of that authority is never mentioned. The truth of Lacan's theories is urged by showing how other people's theories support that truth but without explaining why these theories have the same object. One concept is defined in terms of another, which is then defined in the same way, ad infinitum. What's being explained is mixed in with what's doing the explaining in a circular fashion so striking that it may well count as both a novelty and a technical innovation in the practice of interpretation. Concepts are 'applied' without any boundaries on either the concepts or the scope of their application. Arguments and interpretations are hastily summarized rather than being patiently outlined. Finally, sheer rhetorical force substitutes for argument."
http://www.uchicago.edu/research/jnl-crit-inq/issues/v29/v29n3.harpham1.html
"The effect is that of a stream of nonconsecutive units arranged in arbitrary sequences that solicit a sporadic and discontinuous attention. Zizek does not seem to believe that books should be about something; he reproduces his central themes compulsively regardless of the ostensible subject."
Chomsky on Lacan: "amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan" (he also admits that his early works are worth analyzing). In another post I can longer find the link to, Chomsky concedes he does not actually understand many of Lacan's writings.
http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html
For a rather harsh criticism of the book you are outlining:
http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol5-2001/n17oneill
"In the absence of any detectable method, a dizzying array of wildly entertaining and often quite maddening rhetorical strategies are deployed in order to beguile, browbeat, dumbfound, dazzle, confuse, mislead, overwhelm, and generally subdue the reader into acceptance. Example after example is supplied, but the principle that makes them examples is not itself given. Appeals are implicitly made to Lacan's authority but the source of that authority is never mentioned. The truth of Lacan's theories is urged by showing how other people's theories support that truth but without explaining why these theories have the same object. One concept is defined in terms of another, which is then defined in the same way, ad infinitum. What's being explained is mixed in with what's doing the explaining in a circular fashion so striking that it may well count as both a novelty and a technical innovation in the practice of interpretation. Concepts are 'applied' without any boundaries on either the concepts or the scope of their application. Arguments and interpretations are hastily summarized rather than being patiently outlined. Finally, sheer rhetorical force substitutes for argument."
http://www.uchicago.edu/research/jnl-crit-inq/issues/v29/v29n3.harpham1.html
"The effect is that of a stream of nonconsecutive units arranged in arbitrary sequences that solicit a sporadic and discontinuous attention. Zizek does not seem to believe that books should be about something; he reproduces his central themes compulsively regardless of the ostensible subject."
MEXICAN SOAPS AND THE THREE LEVELS FOR LACAN, S.#2
Mexican soap operas are shot in such a fast rhythm (every single day a 25-minute episode) that the actors do not even get the script to learn their lines in advance; they have tiny receivers in their ears which tell them what to do, and they learn to enact directly what they hear (“Now slap him and tell him you hate him! Then embrace him!…”). This strange procedure provides us with an image of what, according to the common perception, Lacan means by "the big Other.” The symbolic order is the second nature of every speaking being: it is here, directing and controlling my acts; I, as it were, swim in it, but it nonetheless remains ultimately impenetrable and I cannot ever put it in front of me and fully grasp it. It is as if we, subjects of language, talk and interact like puppets, our speech and gestures dictated by some anonymous all-pervasive agency. Does this mean that, for Lacan, we, human individuals, are mere epiphenomena, shadows with no real power of our own, that our self-perception as autonomous free agents is a kind of user’s illusion blinding us for the fact that we are tools in the hands of the big Other which, hidden behind the screen, pulls the strings?
There are, however, many features of the “big Other” which get lost in this simplified notion. For Lacan, the reality of human beings is constituted by three mutually entangled levels: the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. This triad can be nicely illustrated by the game of chess. The rules one has to follow in order to play it are its symbolic dimension: from the purely formal symbolic standpoint, “knight” is defined only by the moves this figure can make. This level is clearly different from the imaginary one, namely the way different pieces are shaped and characterized by their names (king, queen, knight), and it is easy to envision a game with the same rules, but with a different imaginary, in which this figure would be called “messenger” or “runner” or whatever. Finally, real is the entire complex set of contingent circumstances which affect the course of the game: the intelligence of the players, the unpredictable intrusions that may disconcert one of the players or directly cut the game short.
There are, however, many features of the “big Other” which get lost in this simplified notion. For Lacan, the reality of human beings is constituted by three mutually entangled levels: the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. This triad can be nicely illustrated by the game of chess. The rules one has to follow in order to play it are its symbolic dimension: from the purely formal symbolic standpoint, “knight” is defined only by the moves this figure can make. This level is clearly different from the imaginary one, namely the way different pieces are shaped and characterized by their names (king, queen, knight), and it is easy to envision a game with the same rules, but with a different imaginary, in which this figure would be called “messenger” or “runner” or whatever. Finally, real is the entire complex set of contingent circumstances which affect the course of the game: the intelligence of the players, the unpredictable intrusions that may disconcert one of the players or directly cut the game short.
Monday, June 28, 2010
GETTING AT THE BIG OTHER: THAT ELUSIVE, INDESCRIBABLE... THING, S.#1
The first of eight posts committed to a not-so-brief outline of the first chapter of How to Read Lacan, by Slavoj Zizek. This first post will highlight a few key points and phrases in re: Lacan's concern for language (the self-reflexivity, for instance, of an act of communication) and the role of the big Other in our lives (of what impels or dissuades one to do something). Now, I don't claim to to fully understand half of this complicated nonsense, but, nonetheless, here's a little taste of what's to come.
KEY POINTS
• In spite of all its grounding power, the big Other is fragile, insubstantial, practically virtual, in the sense that its status is that of a subjective presupposition.
• The big Other exists insofar as subjects act as if it exits.
• It is the substance of the individuals who recognize themselves in it, the ground of their whole existence, the point of reference that provides the ultimate horizon of meaning, something for which these individuals are ready to give their lives, yet the only thing that really exists are these individuals and their activity, so this substance is actual only insofar as individuals believe in it and act accordingly.
• This virtual character of the big Other means that the symbolic order is not a kind of spiritual substance existing independently of individuals, but something that is sustained through their continuous activity.
• Human communication is characterized by an irreducible reflexivity: every act of communication simultaneously symbolizes the fact of communication.
• Consciousness is opposed to mere knowledge of an object: Knowledge is external to the known object, while consciousness is in itself “practical,” an act that changes its very object.
• Once a worker “considers himself to belong to the ranks of the proletariat,” this changes his very reality: he acts differently.
• When one does something, one counts oneself as (declares oneself) the one who did it, and, on the base of this declaration, one does something new – the proper moment of subjective transformation occurs at the moment of declaration, not at the moment of the act.
• This reflexive moment of declaration means that every utterance not only transmits some content, but, simultaneously, conveys the way the subject relates to this content.
• The question to be raised is: What more doe this statement contain, that has caused you to make it?
• The act of not mentioning or concealing something can create additional meaning.
• One should not forget to include in the content of an act of communication the act itself, since the meaning of each act of communication is also to reflexively assert that it is an act of communication.
KEY POINTS
• In spite of all its grounding power, the big Other is fragile, insubstantial, practically virtual, in the sense that its status is that of a subjective presupposition.
• The big Other exists insofar as subjects act as if it exits.
• It is the substance of the individuals who recognize themselves in it, the ground of their whole existence, the point of reference that provides the ultimate horizon of meaning, something for which these individuals are ready to give their lives, yet the only thing that really exists are these individuals and their activity, so this substance is actual only insofar as individuals believe in it and act accordingly.
• This virtual character of the big Other means that the symbolic order is not a kind of spiritual substance existing independently of individuals, but something that is sustained through their continuous activity.
• Human communication is characterized by an irreducible reflexivity: every act of communication simultaneously symbolizes the fact of communication.
• Consciousness is opposed to mere knowledge of an object: Knowledge is external to the known object, while consciousness is in itself “practical,” an act that changes its very object.
• Once a worker “considers himself to belong to the ranks of the proletariat,” this changes his very reality: he acts differently.
• When one does something, one counts oneself as (declares oneself) the one who did it, and, on the base of this declaration, one does something new – the proper moment of subjective transformation occurs at the moment of declaration, not at the moment of the act.
• This reflexive moment of declaration means that every utterance not only transmits some content, but, simultaneously, conveys the way the subject relates to this content.
• The question to be raised is: What more doe this statement contain, that has caused you to make it?
• The act of not mentioning or concealing something can create additional meaning.
• One should not forget to include in the content of an act of communication the act itself, since the meaning of each act of communication is also to reflexively assert that it is an act of communication.
A "btw," by Anthony Brown
Wtf is up with the "loved but didn't read"? I mean, is not a man having his penis lopped off, sauteed, and then offered to him as a snack interesting? I agree that the review itself was boring (much as this sentence will become) and rather uninformative regarding any conclusive content tying all of these real-life grotesques together, coherently, that is. Anywhozzle, who's ever to blame, or at fault for this option, Fess Up!! Come clean, you fucking dirty monkey! Ok, clearly this lavender iced-tea isn't calming down shit...
Sunday, June 27, 2010
The Psychology of Bliss
[Opening paragraph from a review of the new book "How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like."]
"In 2003, a German computer expert named Armin Meiwes advertised online for someone to kill and then eat. Incredibly, 200 people replied, and Meiwes chose a man named Bernd Brandes. One night, in Meiwes’s farmhouse, Brandes took some sleeping pills and drank some schnapps and was still awake when Meiwes cut off his penis, fried it in olive oil and offered him some to eat. Brandes then retreated to the bathtub, bleeding profusely. Meiwes stabbed him in the neck, chopped him up and stored him in the freezer. Over the next several weeks, he defrosted and sautéed 44 pounds of Brandes, eating him by candlelight with his best cutlery."
"In 2003, a German computer expert named Armin Meiwes advertised online for someone to kill and then eat. Incredibly, 200 people replied, and Meiwes chose a man named Bernd Brandes. One night, in Meiwes’s farmhouse, Brandes took some sleeping pills and drank some schnapps and was still awake when Meiwes cut off his penis, fried it in olive oil and offered him some to eat. Brandes then retreated to the bathtub, bleeding profusely. Meiwes stabbed him in the neck, chopped him up and stored him in the freezer. Over the next several weeks, he defrosted and sautéed 44 pounds of Brandes, eating him by candlelight with his best cutlery."
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
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